A central question in economics and computer science is when and how markets can arrive at an equilibrium. Many existing algorithms for computing equilibria in classes of Arrow-Debreu markets rely on full knowledge of the utility functions of all agents, while in reality we often face unknown markets without this information. A classic approach to unknown markets from economics is tâtonnement -dynamic price update processes that only require oracle access to query the aggregate demand of each good. In this paper, we design a new class of tâtonnement algorithms. For the first time, we show how tâtonnement can converge in polynomial time to market equilibria in linear markets and spending constraint markets, where the main obstacle is a non-continuous demand function. This also gives the first polynomial-time algorithm for spending constraint markets and settles an open question raised in [18] . Moreover, our algorithms can be applied to unknown markets with weak gross substitutes (WGS) property, in which they converge to (1 + ǫ)-approximate market equilibria in time polynomial in market parameters and log(1/ǫ). This exponentially improves the previous convergence rate of polynomial in market parameters and 1/ǫ [12] .
Introduction
A fundamental and much debated question in economics is whether markets operate in or close to equilibrium. The most prominent economic model to study market equilibrium are exchange (Arrow-Debreu) markets [2] , which consist of a set of divisible goods and a set of agents. Each agent has an initial endowment of goods and a utility (preference) function over bundles of goods. Given prices of goods, each agent buys a most preferred bundle that is affordable from the earned money. At equilibrium, market clears, i.e., demand meets supply. As an important special case, Fisher markets [8] are a subclass of exchange markets where buyers and sellers are different agents. Buyers bring money to buy goods while sellers bring goods to earn money.
While existence of equilibrium has been established in broad domains of markets, an obvious prerequisite for a market to operate at equilibrium is that it can be found in reasonable time. Towards this, numerous approaches have been developed within economics and computer science [13, 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 33, 38] . The primary input to these algorithms is the entire description of the market including number of agents, their utility functions and initial endowments. However, obtaining this description is a highly non-trivial task; an entire theory of revealed preferences [31, 35, 36] was developed to study how to infer market parameters from observed prices and buying patterns. This gives rise to the following question: Can we design efficient algorithms that are oblivious to market parameters? In other words, are there efficient algorithms for unknown markets? In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively for a wide class of Fisher and exchange markets for the first time, using the classic approach from economics called tâtonnement.
In 1874, while defining the equilibrium concept, Leon Walras also defined tâtonnement as a natural price update procedure to reach one. Under this procedure a market designer (also known as Secretary of Market [34] or Walrasian auctioneer [7, 28] ) announces prices and observes only aggregate demand and supply of each good. Depending on whether a good is over-or under-demanded, prices are adjusted, and the process iterates until an equilibrium is reached. Such a procedure can provide a fundamental understanding about the nature of price evolution in markets and their convergence and stability properties. Further, note that the market designer is completely oblivious to exact parameters of the market as far as it can observe the aggregate demand and supply.
Extensive work within economics [1, 3, 4, 34] showed convergence of tâtonnement for markets satisfying a property called weak gross substitutes (WGS) , where any increase in prices of a set of goods does not strictly decrease the demand of untouched goods. In contrast, Scarf [32] established non-convergence for the general case. Recent work in computer science established fast convergence of tâtonnement-style methods for wide range of markets [5, 6, [9] [10] [11] [12] 14] (see Section 1.3 for details). However, none of the existing procedures can be used to tackle the simplest case of linear utility functions, where the main obstacle is a non-continuous demand function. On the other hand, many efficient algorithms have been designed for linear markets which require knowledge of all the parameters of the market [16, 18, 26, 30, 39, 42] .
In this paper, we present novel tâtonnement-style algorithms for Fisher and exchange markets with a wide class of utility functions including linear ones. For the case of linear and spending constraint utilities 1 , our algorithms converge to an exact equilibrium in a polynomial number of steps. These are the first tâtonnement-style efficient algorithms for markets under linear and spending constraint utility functions. Further, this also yields the first polynomial-time exact algorithm for spending constraint utilities and settles an open question raised in [18] . Moreover, our algorithms can be applied to unknown markets satisfying WGS property, in which they converge to (1+ǫ)-approximate market equilibria in time polynomial in market parameters and log(1/ǫ). This exponentially improves the previous convergence Utility Functions Algorithms for computing market equilibria rely on structural properties of the utility functions. A natural class are linear utilities when each agent i has non-negative values u ij ≥ 0 for each good j ∈ G, and u i (x) = j∈G u ij x ij . Here we assume all numbers u ij , w ij in the input are L-bit integers. More generally, we consider non-decreasing utility functions that generate markets with the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property -when we increase a price, the demand for goods with untouched prices does not strictly decrease. Linear markets based on L-bit integers have a market equilibrium composed of rational numbers. For general WGS markets, we will assume all demand bundles of agents and market equilibrium is unique. However, even if all utility and endowment parameters are rationals of finite size, demand bundles and the market equilibrium might involve irrational numbers. In this case, we are interested in approximate market equilibria, and our prices will use a prespecified precision depending on the desired approximation factor.
Oracles Our algorithm queries demands for the agents by publishing prices p. Then an oracle returns the total demand x j for each good j ∈ G. It assumes each agent can sell his initial endowment at the given prices and then requests a utility-maximizing bundle of goods for the money he has available. For ease of notation, given any price vector p, let O(p) denote the surplus vector s = (s 1 , . . . , s m ) for the return of the oracle, where s j = p j z j is the surplus (in terms of money) of good j ∈ G. In other words, assuming we publish p, the oracle returns an excess demand vector z = (z 1 , . . . , z m ), then O(p) = p · z.
In general WGS markets the surplus vector might contain irrational values. Thus, we use an approximate demand oracle O(p, µ), which is a blackbox algorithm that takes any price vector p and positive rational µ as input. It returns a surplus vector s such that |s i − O(p)| ≤ µ holds for every good i. The oracle runs in time polynomial in the input size and log(1/µ). This standard assumption for demand oracles has also been used in previous works such as [12, 13] .
In linear markets, a major challenge for tâtonnement is non-uniqueness of demands. Our oracle needs to do tie-breaking between several different bundles of goods that yield the same maximum utility for an agent. Ideally, it should satisfy the following properties: (1) The output demand is always deterministic and unique. (2) If p are equilibrium prices, the output demand equals supply for every good. (3) The oracle can be implemented in time polynomial in the input size. Based on these criteria, we use a demand oracle that yields demands minimizing the ℓ 2 -norm of the surplus vector. More formally, for prices p our oracle returns a set of demand bundles for the agents such that i s 2 i is minimized, where s i is the surplus of good i. Such a tie-breaking rule has been used in several full information algorithms for linear markets, such as [16, 18] . This oracle satisfies properties (1), (2) , and, as shown in [16] , also (3) . Furthermore, if utilities, endowments and prices are all given as integers with a number of bits polynomial in m and L, we can represent every surplus s i also with a number of bits polynomial in m and L. Hence by setting µ sufficiently small, we can convert an approximate demand oracle O into an exact oracle in polynomial time. Therefore we will assume that in linear markets, we are equipped with an exact demand oracle O instead of an approximated one.
Results and Contribution
We present new tâtonnement-style algorithms 2 that converge to market equilibria for linear and WGS markets. Our algorithm in Section 2 converges to an exact market equilibrium in linear Fisher markets.
When all parameters are represented by at most L bits, the convergence time is polynomial in m and L. All prices and demands occurring during the algorithm require a bit precision polynomial in m and L.
More generally, for linear exchange markets, our algorithm in Section 4 also converges to an exact market equilibrium in time polynomial in m and L. It first computes a (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium using a precision that is polynomial in m, L and log(1/ǫ). The exact demands returned by our oracle have the same precision. For a small enough ǫ (using only polynomial bit length), a simple rounding procedure can be applied to the prices that results in an exact market equilibrium. In addition, in Section 5 we extend our results for linear Fisher and exchange markets without modification to spending constraint utilities. These are the first efficient tâtonnement-style algorithms for markets with linear and spending constraint utility functions. Further, this also gives the first polynomial-time exact algorithm for spending constraint utilities and settles an open question raised in [18] .
Next, we apply our approach to general WGS markets, and for technical reasons we present this case earlier in Section 3. Here we converge to a (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in m, log(1/ǫ), and other market parameters. Our algorithm improves exponentially over previous approaches in terms of the dependence on 1/ǫ [12] . Here we specify in advance a precision for prices and rely on approximate demand oracles whose output is within our desired bit precision.
Our tâtonnement algorithms are based on ideas for full information algorithms in linear Fisher [16] and exchange markets [18] . Roughly speaking, they consider goods with the highest surplus and multiplicatively increase their prices. The full information algorithms work on the agents side, they increase prices until structural changes occur in optimal bang-per-buck relations. The progress towards equilibrium is captured in the reduction of the ℓ 2 -norm of surplus. In our case, we have no such information available, the crucial structural events are virtually invisible. This scenario turns out to be much more demanding, and we develop a similar approach on the goods side based only on prices and aggregate demands.
An issue that plays a central role in our algorithms is precision of prices and demands. This seems to have been treated only in minor detail in some of the previous works. For the algorithm of [18] in linear exchange markets these issues are discussed in depth. However, their solution is to change the agents side and alter utility values for maintaining bounded precision throughout the algorithm. Since we want to query the exact unknown market, we cannot take this route.
For our analysis, we use a novel tool that we term ratio graph. This graph is defined for a vector of prices p. The goods are the vertices, and we draw an undirected edge between goods j and k if the ratio of prices p j /p k can be expressed by two L-bit numbers. For an intuition, observe that if some agent i has the same bang-per-buck for two goods j and k, then u ij /p j = u ik /p k or p j /p k = u ij /u ik , i.e., the ratio of prices can be expressed by two L-bit numbers. As such, the equality graph used in [16] to capture bang-per-buck relations is a subgraph of our ratio graph, but beyond this the graphs do not have much in common. Maybe surprisingly, this broad structure indeed contains enough information to implement algorithms for finding equilibria in unknown linear markets.
For linear exchange markets, additional challenges evolve. The surpluses encountered by the algorithm might now become negative, so additional events have to be taken into account upon increasing prices. Another difficulty lies in maintaining the precision of prices to be polynomial throughout the algorithm, and for that we use the ratio graph. Interestingly, by working on the goods side it turns out that our approach can also be applied to the full range of WGS markets to reach (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibria in polynomial time, thereby improving the convergence time from polynomial in 1/ǫ in [12] to polynomial in log(1/ǫ).
Related Work
The problem of computing market equilibria has been intensively studied, and the literature is too vast to survey here. We provide an overview of the work most directly relevant to ours. As mentioned in the introduction, tâtonnement is a natural price update dynamics, which was defined by Walras [40] in 1874. If it converges, it will approach an equilibrium, however, it was not shown under what conditions it converges. Subsequently, it was shown by [1, 3, 4, 34] that the continuous tâtonnement process converges locally for markets satisfying the WGS property. In the computer science literature, [12] gave a discrete tâtonnement process that converges to an (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium for WGS markets with convergence time polynomial in the input size and 1/ǫ. Our result for the same market setting improves this rate to polynomial in the input size and log(1/ǫ).
More recently, [14] established the first fast converging discrete version of tâtonnement for WGS markets. The convergence time depends on various market parameters. It is a distributed algorithm which requires a non-zero amount of money in the market, so it works for Fisher markets and beyond, but it is not applicable to the exchange market. Afterwards, many remarkable results [5, 6, [9] [10] [11] on the convergence of tâtonnement processes beyond WGS markets were derived, for the Fisher setting.
Tâtonnement dynamics have been extensively studied in general equilibrium theory; see the textbook [29] for further classic results. All this work assumes that the demand is a single-valued function of the prices. This is not the case for linear and spending constraint utility functions, and hence these processes are not directly applicable.
A different process called Proportional Response dynamics is studied for market equilibrium in [41, 43] for linear and CES utilities with parameter 0 < ρ < 1. This is a different dynamics which works in the agents' allocation space rather than on prices. For linear utilities, convergence for exchange markets occurs in the limit. For Fisher markets, approximate equilibrium is reached in exponential time.
There is a large body of work on centralized algorithms for computing market equilibrium using full market information. The first polynomial-time algorithm for linear Fisher markets was given in [16] . Later, [37] provided a polynomial-time algorithm for Fisher markets with spending constraint utilities by extending the combinatorial techniques of [16] . Strongly polynomial-time algorithms are also known, for Fisher markets with linear [30, 39] and spending constraint utilities [39] .
For linear exchange markets, [26] and [42] obtained polynomial-time algorithms based on ellipsoid and interior point methods on a convex program, respectively. Recently, [18] gave the first combinatorial polynomial-time algorithm for this problem. For exchange markets with spending constraint utilities, [17] gave an algorithm to compute a (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium, whose running time dependence on ǫ is O(1/ǫ 2 ).
Finally, for a general class of WGS markets a polynomial-time algorithm was obtained by [13] . [20] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for markets under Cobb-Douglas utilities, which satisfy the WGS property. For the Fisher setting, the famous Eisenberg-Gale convex program [22] captures market equilibrium under linear utilities. Later, Eisenberg [21] generalized it to work for any homogeneous utility functions, many of which satisfy the WGS property.
Linear Fisher Markets
In this section, we adapt the celebrated algorithm [16] (which we will refer to as DPSV algorithm) for computing equilibria in linear Fisher markets to work in an unknown market environment. The only assumption we require is that L is known to the algorithm. Note that there is an exact market equilibrium, in which all prices are rational numbers with a denominator of at most ∆ = m log m + mL bits [16] . Furthermore, when demands are chosen according to our oracle O, the markets satisfy the WGS property. We treat Fisher markets separately in this section to convey the main ideas of our approach. Find the smallest x > 1, such that in
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The algorithm and its analysis for exchange markets need to address additional issues and are more involved.
Description of the Algorithm Our algorithm Alg-Fisher for linear Fisher markets is given below. Throughout the algorithm we maintain the following invariant: The surplus of each good is non-negative. Alg-Fisher starts with a set of initial prices where the above invariant holds. They are obtained through a procedure InitialPrices. It assigns a very low price to each good so that each agent can afford every good. Some goods may still have negative surplus. For each such good, the procedure decreases its price to the largest possible value that results in the surplus becoming non-negative. Once the surplus is non-negative, it remains non-negative. For linear markets, this will be achieved at a rational value with bounded denominator. The corresponding prices can be obtained in polynomial time through a binary search. After running InitialPrices, we have prices which satisfy the above invariant, and these prices are rational numbers with bounded denominator.
Similar to [16] , our algorithm is divided into a set of phases, and each phase has a number of iterations. Each phase starts with a set H of maximum surplus goods and increases prices of H by the same multiplicative factor x > 1 until one of the following two events occurs: In Event 1 the surplus of some good outside H becomes more than or equal to the surplus of a good in H. In Event 2 the surplus of some good in H becomes zero.
The phase ends when Event 2 occurs. When Event 1 happens, we extend H by adding all goods outside H, whose surplus is now more than or equal to the surplus of a good in H. Clearly, the size of H increases by at least one upon each Event 1. Hence, the number of iterations in a phase is at most m. We will maintain a potential function Φ(p) = i∈G (O(p)) 2 i that captures the ℓ 2 -norm of the surplus s = O(p). The analysis will show that at the end of each phase Φ has been descreased substantially.
Comparison with the DPSV algorithm Our algorithm is an adaptation of the DPSV algorithm to an unknown market environment -Alg-Fisher is a DPSV-style algorithm working on the goods side. It relies on carefully designed events that guarantee reduction of Φ. Finding the right events to guarantee correctness and prove polynomial running time is a challenge in the unknown market setting.
The DPSV algorithm works on the agents side using the tools of equality graph EG(p) and equality network N (p) (for formal definitions see our analysis in the next Section 2.1), which describe the maximum bang-per-buck relations among agents and goods. The algorithm maintains the invariant that each good is fully sold and agents have surplus money. It iteratively minimizes the surpluses of agents, and when the total surplus becomes zero, then it reaches the market equilibrium. A phase starts with a set of maximum surplus agents and the goods on which these agents are spending their money. These are called the active sets of agents and goods. Then prices of goods in the active set are raised until one of the following two events occur: (1) A new edge appears in EG(p). (2) A subset of agents in the active set becomes "tight".
Our events have different interpretations because we cannot see agents and utilities in unknown markets. However, our events have a similar effect on the decrease of Φ. We cannot detect Event (1) with new equality edges in EG(p), but when they appear, surplus of agents outside the active set may change due to balancing. In short, the essence of this event is in just capturing the new set of buyers outside the active set, whose surplus is now more or equal to surplus of a buyer in the active set. This interpretation is key to capture this event also in an unknown market, which may occur even without the appearance of a new equality edge in EG(p). For our analysis, however, these differences do not matter.
Event (2) occurs in the DPSV algorithm when a subset of the active set becomes tight, i.e., surplus of an agent in the active set becomes zero. The interpretation is that if the DPSV algorithm ignores this event and keeps raising prices, then it won't maintain the invariant. In fact, in Alg-Fisher we rely on a similar event when surplus of a good becomes zero.
Precision and Representation
Our goal is to eventually do binary search to find x in each iteration. For this to work in polynomial time, we need that the desired x in each iteration is a ratio of two integers, each represented by polynomially many bits. Also, for the entire algorithm to work in polynomial time, all intermediate prices should also be represented by polynomially many bits. It is not clear to us if all intermediate prices in the DPSV algorithm have this property. Showing this is even more tricky in the case of unknown markets. Next, we appropriately modify our algorithm so that we can show all intermediate prices and x to be representable using polynomial bit length.
Equality and Ratio Graph. The main tool for the analysis of the DPSV algorithm is an equality graph, denoted by EG(p). This graph remains completely unknown to our algorithm, but it proves useful when proving properties of the convergence process. The vertex set of this bipartite graph consists of the set of agents A and the set of goods G. Given a price vector p t , we introduce an edge from buyer i to good j if and only if u ij /p j = max k u ik /p k , i.e., good j with price p j gives maximum utility per unit amount of money for buyer i. Hence, we introduce edges between buyers and goods whenever the good gives maximum bang-for-buck for this buyer. Observe that this graph changes throughout the process when we update the price vector p t .
Based on EG(p) we can construct an equality network denoted by N (p): First assign a capacity of infinity for each edge in EG(p), then add a source vertex s and a sink vertex t. For each agent a ∈ A, add an edge from s to a with capacity equal to the budget of this agent a, and finally add an edge from every good to sink t with capacity infinity. It is easy to see that every maximum flow in this network represents a feasible demand allocation for each agent. Similar to [16] , we define a balanced flow as a maximal flow in N (p) that minimizes i∈G (f it − p i ) 2 , where f it is the flow along edge (i, t). By assumption, O(p) returns the surplus vector derived from (any) balanced flow of the network N (p) 3 .
As mentioned above, our algorithm cannot see EG(p). We use a different structure that can be observed on the goods side.
Definition 2.1. The ratio graph RG(M, p) is an undirected graph with m vertices (where m is the number of goods in the market), and for any two goods i and j, (i, j) is an edge if and only if p i /p j can be represented as a ratio of two integers, each of value at most
We can compute the ratio graph using only the price vector and the input size bound. It allows us to retrieve some information about the hidden structure of EG(p).
Claim 2.1. Let L be the upper bound on the number of bits to present each utility parameter and p be a price vector. For any price vector p and goods i, j that are connected in EG(p), i and j are also connected in RG(
M, p) for any M ≥ L.
Proof. If good i and good j are connected in EG(p), then there exist goods i
such that for each t < k, there exists some agent a t that has maximum bang-per-buck for both goods i t and i t+1 . Then we have p it /p i t+1 = u atit /u ati t+1 , a ratio of two integers, each of value at most 2 L . This implies (i t , i t+1 ) ∈ RG(M, p), so i and j are connected in RG(M, p).
In Alg-Fisher-Precise we modify Alg-Fisher to obtain bounded precision and polynomial running time in two ways.
Connectivity within goods in G 1 : We maintain the property that all goods in G 1 are always connected in the ratio graph RG(L, p t ). In order to achieve this, first we take only a subset of maximum surplus goods which are connected in RG(L, p 0 ) as our initial set G 1 . Second, Event (1) happens only when there is a good j / ∈ G 1 whose surplus is at least the surplus of some good in G 1 , and there is a new edge that connects j to some vertex in G 1 in the updated ratio graph. Now since goods in G 1 are connected in the ratio graph, we can guarantee that whenever some price in G 1 falls into ∆ = m log m + ml bits representation, all prices in G 1 can be represented in at most 2∆ bits. Hence, in the following Lemma 2.1 we are able to bound the number of bits required for representation of all prices throughout the algorithm. 
Binary search the smallest x ∈ P, such that in
Proof. A phase ends when the surpluses of a subset of goods in G 1 become zero. This implies that the sum of these prices is an integer, and the ratios of prices are rational numbers with numerator and denominator at most 2 L − 1. It follows that prices of this subset of goods are rational numbers with denominator at most 2 ∆ . Moreover, since we raise the prices by the same multiplicative factor, the ratios of prices of all other goods in G 1 remain the same. So we can assume that every other price of G 1 has denominator at most 2 2∆ . Further, we have not touched the prices of G 2 = [m] \ G 1 , so they remain the same as in the beginning of the phase.
Find x efficiently:
We show in Lemma 2.2 that after the first change, the value of x desired in each iteration is always a rational number with denominator at most 2 5∆ . The maximum budget is B, and there is a good with initial price 1/m, so the maximum x can be at most mB. This guarantee allows us to employ an efficient binary search procedure [27] to find the desired x ∈ (1, mB) among all rational numbers whose denominators are at most 2 5∆ (which implies an upper bound of mB·2 5∆ on the numerator of x). Similarly, we also obtain a bound on the representation size of intermediate prices. We show that the prices are rational numbers with denominator at most 2 3∆ . Since each price grows to at most a value of B, there is also an upper bound of B · 2 3∆ on the numerator. Proof. From Lemma 2.1, in the beginning of each phase, all prices are rational numbers with denominator at most 2 2∆ . During the first Event (1), we have xp k = p j , where j ∈ G 1 , k ∈ G 1 . This implies that x is a rational number with denominator at most 2 4∆+L , and new prices p ′ j = xp j are rational numbers with denominator at most 2 2∆+L . Similarly, x of the k th Event (1) is a rational number with denominator at most 2 4∆+kL , and prices are rational numbers with denominator at most 2 2∆+L .
Remark: Note that Event (2) resets the required number of bits to represent every price to 2 2∆ .
Correctness and Running Time
All prices are monotonically increased throughout the algorithm. From Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 we can deduce that the algorithm will terminate, because in every phase at least one price is strictly increased by a minimum value. We only need to show that the invariant of non-negative surplus is maintained throughout the algorithm. (1), the surplus of every good remains non-negative and the invariant is maintained. If Event (1) does not happen, we only need to show that the surplus of goods in G 1 decreases continuously. Then, at some point it will become zero and that will be captured as Event (2) . Indeed, this is true, because we maintain all equality edges in EG(p) by raising prices of G 1 by the same multiplicative factor, and the surplus does not behave non-continuously in the absence of Event (1).
The running time analysis for our algorithm is exactly same as for the DPSV algorithm [16] . It is based on showing that Φ(p) decreases substantially in each phase. At the beginning of each phase, we start with a set of goods G 1 which have maximum surplus δ, and in the end the surplus of some good in G 1 becomes zero. Note that G 1 grows during a phase, but this does not matter because we add only those goods whose surplus is at least the surplus of a good already in G 1 . There are at most m iterations in a phase, so there has to be one iteration where surplus is dropped by δ/m. In the beginning of a phase, Φ(p t ) ≤ mδ 2 , then in the end it drops to Φ(
In the beginning of the algorithm Φ(p) ≤ B 2 (total budget), and when it becomes 2 −4∆ then Lemma 2.1 implies that there is at most one more phase left. Therefore, we obtain the following theorem. 
WGS Exchange Markets
In this section we describe the algorithm for WGS exchange markets. We apply algorithm Alg-WGS given below, which relies on a constant R 1 to be explained in detail below, and two parameters D 1 and D 2 based on the following assumptions. These two assumptions are precisely the ones from [12, 13] . Assumption 3.1 about bounded prices is fairly mild and in many cases necessary for an efficient algorithm to compute a (strong) approximate market equilibrium. Assumption 3.2 about continuity is also satisfied by many natural markets, for (1, 1, . . . , 1) and round index t ← 0.
Assumption 3.1 (Bounded Price). There exists a market equilibrium
(p * , x * ) with 1 ≤ p * i ≤ 2 D 1 , ∀i ∈ G.
Assumption 3.2 (Continuity). For any price vector
Sorts such thats i 1 ≥s i 2 ≥ · · · ≥s im .
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example, markets with CES utilities with 0 < ρ < 1. Note, however, that it is not satisfied for linear markets, and this is the reason we need to develop new tools and procedures to tackle the linear case in Section 4.
To measure progress towards equilibrium we use a potential function Φ(p t ) = O(p t , µ) 2 . Throughout the analysis and proofs below, if s = O(p) for some p, we uses to denote the surplus vector returned by the µ-approximation demand oracle with the same price vector, i.e.,s = O(p, µ). We start by proving a number of claims about the price vector p t . The first claim shows that with respect to exact demands, our algorithm monotonically reduces the 1-norm of the surpluses of all goods from 2m. 
Hence, we do not introduce any new negative surplus in O(p t ). Thus, we have
The next two claims bound the range of prices we encounter, which is important for showing that we approach the unique market equilibrium. 
The surplus of any good does not change from non-negative to negative. (3) For any non-equilibrium price vector, there will always be a good with negative surplus. These facts are direct consequences of the conditions used to classify goods based on O(p t ) in the algorithm. Together they prove the claim. 
Next, we apply a sequence of price changes to p t . First, for every j / ∈ S we increase (p t ) j to p * j . Let p be the new price vector and consider the surplus O(p) resulting from exact demands. By the WGS property of the market, the surplus of any good in S will not decrease, hence we still have O(p) i > 0 for every i ∈ S. The sum of all surpluses in an exchange market is always 0, so j / ∈S O(p) j < 0. Now we decrease the price of every good i ∈ S from p i to p * i . Then p becomes exactly p * . This process will not increase the surplus of any good j ∈ S. Thus we still have j / ∈S O(p * ) j < 0. This contradicts the assumption that p * are prices of a market equilibrium.
The following claim establishes a relation between the surplus of a good with respect to exact demands before and after a multiplicative price update step.
Claim 3.4. For any price vector p, x > 1 and S
Proof. Because prices are scalable in exchange markets, we have O(x · p) = x · O(p) for any value x > 0. Also, by the WGS property, when we decrease any set of prices, this will not increase the demand for goods with untouched price. Since these goods have untouched price and non-decreasing demand, they also enjoy non-decreasing surplus. Therefore for any i ∈ S, we have O (Update(p, x, S) 
Next, we establish a statement about the surpluses at the end of each round. Intuitively, we increase the prices of goods in G 1 until the minimum surplus in G 1 is close to the maximum surplus in G 2 or 0. Note that µ is very small and can be thought of as 0. The main technicality here is that we need to work with µ-approximation demands in the algorithm and the resulting surplusess ′ .
Claim 3.5. At the end of each round in
According to the binary search procedure, we know that if we increase prices in G 1 by a factor of x, thens ′ satisfies the condition min{s (p t−1 , x + , G 1 ) ). By Assumption 3.2, we have
for every i, where the last inequality is derived by Claim 3.3. Thus
The next lemma is the key step in the proof of our main result. It establishes a multiplicative decrease of the potential function at the end of each round. In the following lemmas, let R 2 be a sufficiently large constant to be explained in detail below.
Proof. We use the following notation. Let s = O(p t−1 ),s = O(p t−1 , µ) and s
An intuition of the proof is as follows. In Algorithm 4, by the conditions used to define G 1 and G 2 , we always haves i k ≥s i 1 /e ands i k −s i k+1 >s i k /(m + 1) ≥s i 1 /e(m + 1). Hence, roughly speaking, every good in G 1 has reasonably large surplus, and there is a reasonably large gap between the surpluses in G 1 and G 2 . Next, at the end of the current round, we decreased the minimum surplus of a good in G 1 to either min{s (2) below). In both cases, the total value of Φ must decrease by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ).
More formally, if the algorithm proceeds to round t, then s > ǫ ′2 . By the definition of set G 1 , we havẽ
so the surpluses of goods in G 1 are similar up to a factor of e and bounded from below. Also we have (
Since we rely on an approximate demand oracle, the surpluses of goods in G 1 might not change in a monotone fashion when increasing their prices. Nevertheless, we can relate the surplus in the beginning and the end of a round as follows. For every i ∈ G 1 , by Claim 3.4, the surplus from exact demands satisfies
it holds that (1 + x)µ < 3µ ≤s i /(R 2 m 3 ). This means the increase within a round is bounded bys
Since we do not touch the price of any good j ∈ G 2 , the WGS property implies for exact demands s ′ j ≥ s j . Hences ′ j ≥s j − 2µ. Now, in order to bound the change of Φ(p t ), we considers ′ according to G 1 and G 2 . We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: max{s
Intuitively, in this case the algorithm has decreased the surplus of some good in G 1 to approximatley 0 (recall that µ is sufficiently small). This decrease alone brings down the potential function Φ by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m). All other surpluses will cause an increase by a factor of at most 1 + O(1/m 3 ).
More formally, Claim 3.5 gives us µ < min{s ′ i | i ∈ G 1 } < 7µ. Hence, the contribution of goods of G 1 to Φ(p t ) can be upper bounded by
Furthermore, for every i ∈ G 2 , if −m 3 µ ≤s ′ i ≤ µ, we haves ′2 i ≤ m 6 µ 2 , and ifs ′ i < −µ, by the WGS property of the market, we know s i ≤ s ′ i ≤s ′ i + µ < 0. Thus, sinces ′ j ≥s j − 2µ,
Hence, the contribution of goods of G 2 to Φ(p t ) can be upper bounded by
Combining the two parts
where the last inequality holds for any m ≥ 2 with sufficiently large constants R 1 , R 2 .
Case 2: max{s
Intuitively, in this case the gap between surpluses in G 1 and G 2 decreases to approximately 0. Below we show that the closing this gap yields a decrease of the potential function Φ by a factor of 1−Ω(1/m 3 ). All other surpluses will increase by a factor of at most 1+O(1/m 3 ). In combination, it turns out that Φ will decrease by a factor of 1 − Ω(1/m 3 ).
More formally, in this case min{s
Now we have
Here (1) can be derived by expanding the quadratic formula and appropriately reorganizing the terms. For the step from (1) to (2), in the first bracket we overestimate the quadratic terms ofs into x ′2 Φ(p t−1 ) and |G 2 | by m. In the second bracket, we return tos ′ i ands ′ j , which in turn are bounded correctly using s G 1 for all i ∈ G 1 and s G 2 for all j ∈ G 2 . For the final two terms in (1) and (2) we use the definition of s i k ands i k+1 and the fact that x ′ > 1. For the step from (2) to (3), for the first bracket of (2) we usẽ s j ≥s m for every j ∈ G 2 . For the second bracket of (2) we notes G 1 ≥s G 2 and the difference between the sums of δ-terms is bounded by 4mµ as noted above. By the same argument, we can transform the last two terms of (2) as shown. Note that we simply drop −2µ j∈G 2 δ j < 0. From (3) to (4) we use the fact that every surplus is bounded by 2m in its absolute value by Claim 3.1. For the last term we use the bound for i∈G 1 δ i as noted above. From (4) to (5), we just replace µ by its definition and use the bound Φ(p t−1 ) > ǫ ′2 and (
Finally, using sufficiently large constants R 1 , R 2 , the multiplicative term in (5) can be decreased to strictly less than 1 for every m ≥ 2. The final expression in (6) captures the asymptotics and proves the lemma.
Observe that the previous lemma shows a decrease in the potential only for rounds in which the x determined by binary search is rather small. The next lemma shows that there can be only a limited number of rounds with a larger value of x. Finally, we can assemble the properties to show the main result of this section. Proof. Let x t be the value of x we find in round t of Alg-WGS. First because at least one price will increase by a factor of x t in round t, by Claim 3.3 we have t x t ≤ 2 mD 1 . At the end of round t, if 
For all other rounds, we have x < 1 + 1 R 2 m 3 , and by Lemma 3.1, the potential function is decreased by a factor of 1/(1 − Ω( 1 m 3 )). Therefore the total number of rounds before Φ(p t ) ≤ ǫ ′2 will be at most
In each round, the number of queries to the oracle is no more than O(log ∆) = O(D 1 + D 2 + log m + log 
Linear Exchange Markets
For linear markets, we extend the approach for WGS markets in the last section. The challenge is that surplus can change in a non-continuous way when prices change the goods with maximum bang-per-buck. However, we show how to use the linear structure of the market to get rough information about these breakpoints. Also, we maintain prices within a polynomial precision and guarantee convergence to an approximate market equilibrium. Finally, we show that when Φ(p) becomes small enough, a simple rounding procedure applied to the prices results in an exact market equilibrium.
Our only assumption is that all utility values u ij are represented within L bits, where L is known to the algorithm. This implies as a corollary a variant of Assumption 3.1 -there is an exact market equilibrium with prices p such that
where D 1 is a polynomial of m and L. As mentioned before, Assumption 3.2 does not hold in linear markets.
The Framework
Alg-Linear specifies the general framework of our algorithm, which is similar to the approach taken previously for WGS markets. As mentioned in Section 1.1, here we do not resort to approximation parameter µ, but instead compute the exact surplus. We first analyze Alg-Linear and show that it needs only a polynomial number of rounds to converge to an approximate market equilibrium. For now, our analysis disregards all precision and representation issues. In particular, we assume to find the exact value x using binary search, irrespective of the number of bits needed for representation. Also, the update of prices from p t−1 to p t will multiply all prices of goods in G 1 by x, irrespective of the number of bits required to represent them. In our final algorithm below, we will show how to address these issues to obtain a (true) polynomial-time algorithm.
For analysis of the framework recall the notions of equality graph EG(p) and network N (p) defined above in Section 2. The analysis of Alg-Linear follows along previous arguments, where we rely on the following lemma. Proof. To prove this lemma, we make use of a max-min fair property for balanced flows proved in previous work. A vector s is called max-min fair iff for every feasible vector s ′ and i such that s i < s ′ i , there is some j with s j < s i , such that s j > s ′ j . We rely on the following claim that is proved in [16] . Claim. [16] The surplus vector of a balanced flow in N (G) is max-min fair.
We proceed to prove Lemma 4.1 by contradiction to this claim. Suppose we increase the price of some good k from p k to p k + δ. Denote the old price vector by p and the new price vector by p ′ . Let f and f ′ be the balanced flows in networks N (p) and N (p ′ ), respectively. Now assume for contradiction that there exists some
It is easy to verify the following properties.
(b) N (p ′ ) does not include any edges (i, j) with i ∈ S A and j ∈ S G . If such an edge (i, j) exists, j must be different from k, hence this edge also exists in N (p). Then agent i can reroute some flow from S G to good j to obtain a more balanced flow in N (p).
The above two observations imply that we can rearrange flows from S A to S G in f ′ to get a new maximal flow f ′′ in network N (p ′ ) such that for all i ∈ S A and j ∈ S G , f ′′ ij ≥ f ij , and for all other edges
Let s be the surplus vector produced from flow f ′′ . Then for any j / ∈ S G , we have s j = O(p ′ ) j , and for any j ∈ S G , s j ≥ O(p) j . In particular, we have s j > O(p ′ ) ℓ for all j ∈ S A . This contradicts the fact that O(p ′ ) is max-min fair and proves Lemma 4.1. Now the following properties can be proved using literally the same proofs as for WGS markets before. 
For any price vector p, x > 1 and S
⊆ [m], O(Update(p, x, S)) i ≤ x · O(p) i for any i ∈ S.
The number of rounds that end with
We also show a version of Claim 3.2 for linear markets, which needs some extra work. Unlike for WGS markets, the surplus of a good can change from non-negative to negative. Thus, the proof of Claim 3.2 does not directly transfer to linear markets. Instead, we first show the following.
Claim 4.2. Let S t be the set of goods with negative surplus and price strictly greater than 1 at the end of round t in Alg-Linear. For any T ⊆ S t , let Γ(T, p t ) be the neighbors of set T in EG(p t ), i.e., Γ(T, p t ) is the set of agents who are interested in at least one good in T under price p t . Let B(Γ(T, p t )) be the sum of budgets of agents in Γ(T, p t ). Then we have B(Γ(T, p
Proof
Because the surplus of any good in G 2 is non-decreasing in round t, we have S t ⊆ S t−1 . Further, the algorithm does not increase the price of any good in T in round t.
Hence, we also have Γ(T, p t−1 ) ⊆ Γ(T, p t ). By the induction assumption, we have B(Γ(T, p
. Now x must be at a point where at least one new edge emerges in the equality graph EG(p t ) from Γ(G 1 ) ⊆ A to G 2 . Suppose we alter the equality graph by removing these emerging edges from EG(p t ). If we recompute the balanced flow, then min{s
. In this new graph, let Γ ′ (T 1 ) be the set of agents who have positive flow to at least one good in T 1 , and let Γ ′ (T 2 ) be the set of buyers incident to at least one good in T 2 . Since min{s
because every good in T 1 has positive surplus, and B(Γ ′ (T 2 )) > i∈T 2 (p t ) i because the claim is true in round t − 1. Combining these two inequalities gives us B (Γ(T, p t ) ) > i∈T (p t ) i .
Corollary 4.1. At the end of each round t in Alg-Linear, for any good i with negative surplus and price greater than 1, there exists another good j with price 1 that is connected to i in EG(p t )
Proof. Assume for contradiction that the statement is false. Let T be the set of goods with negative surplus and connected with good i in EG(p t ). By the balanced flow condition, none of the buyers in Γ(T, p t ) can have any positive flow to goods outside set T . Thus we have 0
We obtain the following corollary, which is the analog of Claim 3.2 for linear markets. The set of properties shown so far allows to establish the following lemma, which is the key step for observing convergence to equilibrium. It can be seen as an adjustment of Lemma 3.1 to linear markets. As before, it involves a sufficiently large constant R.
Proof. Our proof uses the arguments of the proof for Lemma 3.1. We consider two cases:
. This case can be verified by observing that Claim 3.5 holds with µ = 0. Then the proof follows using exactly the same proof as for Lemma 3.1.
Case 2: min{s
. In this case, x must be at a point where at least one new edge emerges in the equality graph EG(p t ) from Γ(G 1 ) ⊆ A (the set of agents incident to at least one good in G 1 ) to G 2 . Without these emerging edges, we have min{s
This means that we can further reduce the flows along the new edges to get another feasible flow in N (p t ), such that with the resulting surplus vector s ′′ we have min{s
Next, using again the same proof as for Lemma 3.1, for sufficiently large constant R we can show that
Assume without loss of generality that G 1 is a component with min i∈C 1 
Precision and Representation
It is now tempting to think that using a similar argument as in the general WGS case, Claim 4.1, Corollary 4.2 and Lemma 4.2 provide an algorithm that converges to an approximate market equilibrium in polynomial time. However, an issue arises with regard to the precision and representation of the prices: In each round, x could potentially be a rational number involving prices and surpluses, and after multiplying each price in G 1 by x, the bit length to represent a price can double in one round. This means that after a polynomial number of rounds, we may require an exponential number of bits to represent the prices of some goods as well as the desired factor x. For Fisher markets in Section 2.1, this issue was resolved by Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 -at the end of each phase, all prices become ratios of integers of bounded value, and thus the required factor x requires only bounded precision. For exchange markets, this does not necessarily hold. One solution with full information about the market [18] is to use approximate arithmetic and approximate demands in each round. However, this requires the algorithm to have access to particular oracles based on approximate utility values, which we do not have. Here we develop a new approach to tackle this issue.
Recall the ratio graph and Claim 2.1 from Section 2.1. As an adjustment, we run the following procedure Rounding(p, M ) at the end of each iteration of the main loop in Alg-Linear. Its purpose is to round the prices within polynomial bit length while maintaining the structure of equality and ratio graphs. Thereby, we will show that the value of potential function Φ(p) will not be increased dramatically.
Our new algorithm Alg-Linear-Rounding is simply the framework Alg-Linear with the following modifications:
(1) Set ǫ = 4m/(8m 4m 2 3Lm ).
(2) In each round, binary search
(3) At the end of each round t, update p t ← Rounding(p t , M ) with M = log 2 5m 7 ǫ ′2 = 7 log 2 (5m) + 12m log 2 (m) + 3Lm.
(4) After the final iteration of the algorithm, before returning price vector p t , round every price in p t to the nearest rational number with denominator no more than (m2 L ) m .
We will show that this algorithm returns the price vector of an exact market equilibrium in polynomial time. Let us first focus on the impact of Rounding in the algorithm. 
Proof. Property (a) holds since we never increase the price of goods in set C 1 , and property (b) can be derived based on property (a) and the fact that RG(M, p) is connected when the algorithm terminates.
Next we claim that for any i, j, there does not exist any x ∈ P, such that
This is because by design, p i /p j has to reach x in some iteration before it grows beyond x. But starting from that moment until the end of the algorithm, i and j will be connected in RG (M, p) . The ratios between two prices in the same connected component in RG(M, p) remain unchanged. Hence p i /p j will never grow beyond x.
This claim also proves property (c). By Claim 2.1, a pair of goods i and j connected in EG(p) remain connected in RG(M, p). Hence, their ratio of prices will remain the same in p ′ , and they are connected in EG(p ′ ).
For property (d), according to the algorithm no price will decrease from p to p ′ . Next, number the goods such that
Finally, in each iteration we add at least one edge between two connected components in RG(M, p). Thus the algorithm will terminate after at most m−1 iterations, and it is easy to check that each iteration runs in polynomial time. This proves the claim.
Once the prices are bounded by a fixed polynomial bit length, we can also bound the length needed to encode the desired x in each round. This implies that we can find x in the framework in polynomial time using binary search. Proof. Let p = p t−1 and consider the structure of EG(p). We let A 1 = Γ(G 1 ) be the agents connected to goods in G 1 . Also, let A 2 = A \ A 1 . There is no (i, j) ∈ EG(p) with i ∈ A 1 and j ∈ G 2 , since otherwise O(p t−1 ) could increase the money spent on goods in G 2 and further decrease Φ(p t−1 ). For simplicity, we will also assume that there is no edge (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 1 , since no agent spends money along these edges and they immediately disappear once we start increasing prices in G 1 . Now we increase p on goods in j ∈ G 1 by x and get a new price vector p(x). This only generates new edges (i, j) ∈ A 1 × G 2 . Furthermore, we drop only edges (i, j) ∈ A 1 × G 1 . To verify this let us consider the other possibilities. The relation between marginal utility values u ij /p j and u ik /p k for goods in j, k ∈ G 1 does not change, since both p j and p k are both multiplied by x. Hence, there are no new edges (i, j) ∈ A 1 × G 1 . For the same reason, there are no new edges (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 2 . The bang-per-buck of goods in G 1 decreases, so we also do not introduce edges (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 1 . In fact, this also implies that we do not drop any edges (i, j) ∈ A 2 × G 2 -prices and bang-per-buck relations among goods in G 2 do not change at all and G 2 becomes more attractive compared to G 1 . Finally, there exist no edges (i, j) ∈ (A 1 × G 2 ) ∪ (A 2 × G 1 ) that could be removed. This shows that we only generate new edges between A 1 and G 2 , and we only drop edges between A 1 and G 1 .
For any given x, consider the residual graph of N (Update(p, x, G 1 ) ). Let C be an arbitrary connected component in this graph. Let C A be the set of agents in C and C G be the set of goods in C. Then we know that all goods in C G have the same surplus, and all flow going through C G comes from agents in C A . This implies the following equation:
where s is the surplus of (any) good in this component. Now let us focus on the moment where x reaches the desired value at the end of round t according to the algorithm. At this moment, one of the following properties must hold:
Then for the connected component that contains a good of surplus 0, we have s = 0 in the above equation. All initial prices p i are ratios of integers with values at most 2 mM , so when we solve the equation for x, the solution is a ratio of two integers with value at most m2 mM = 2 mM +log m .
In this case, we have two possibilities:
-There exist two connected components in the residual graph of N (Update(p, x, G 1 )) that have the same surplus. Applying the above equation to these two components, we can solve for x, and the solution will be a ratio of two integers with value at most m 2 2 mM = 2 mM +2 log m . 
Let s be the surplus vector derived from f ′ , then we have
Note that s is just one feasible surplus vector for price vector p ′ t , and Φ(p ′ t ) minimizes the ℓ 2 -norm of surpluses among all feasible surplus vectors. Hence, Φ(Rounding(p t , M )) ≤ s 2 2 < O(p t ) 2 2 +5m 3 2 −M . This proves the lemma.
Rounding can be used to obtain an algorithm that converges to an approximate market equilibrium in polynomial time. It then remains to convert the approximate equilibrium to an exact one. Note that Rounding can generate a small increase in the potential function Φ(p) each time. Hence, by the time we have Φ(p) < ǫ ′2 , the bit length to represent a price in p may be related to ǫ. Therefore, we cannot argue the same way as for Fisher markets to get an exact market equilibrium. Instead, we use an extra rounding step at the end of the algorithm.
Given a price vector p, for any buyer i and good j, we add an edge (i, j) to graph EG(p) if buyer i has a positive amount of endowment of good j. We denote the new graph by EG ′ (p). We first show the following claim. Proof. Assume by contradiction that there exists some round t and a connected component C of EG ′ (p t ), such that C does not contain any good with price 1 at the end of round t. For any price vector p, we use EG ′ (p) C to denote the subgraph induced by all goods in C and all agents connected to at least one good of C.
Note that at the end of round t, the total supply is equal to the total demand within component C, thus the sum of surpluses of all goods in C is 0. If there exists a good in C with non-zero surplus, there must exist some good in C with negative surplus. Next by Corollary 4.1, this good either has price 1 itself, or it must be connected with some good with price 1. Therefore every good in C has to have surplus 0 at the end of round t.
For every good j ∈ C, let a(j) be the earliest round at the end of which the price of good j reaches (p t ) j . This means good j's price remains unchanged after round a(j), hence by the WGS property, its surplus will not decrease after round a(j). This implies O(p a(j) ) j ≤ 0 for every good j ∈ C. Now distinguish two cases for contradiction:
Case 1: There exists some good j ∈ C with O(p a(j) ) j < 0. If there are more than one such goods, let j be the one with the smallest a(j). Note that good j has positive surplus at the end of round a(j) − 1, but the surplus drops to negative at the end of round a(j). This event can only occur due to introduction of some new edges towards goods in G 2 in the equality graph at the end of round a(j). More formally, we let E = EG(p a(j) ) \ EG(p a(j)−1 ). Suppose at the end of round a(j), we remove E from the equality graph EG(p a(j) ) and recompute the balanced flow with respect to price vector p a(j) . Let f be such a balanced flow and let s = (s 1 , . . . , s m ) be the surpluses with respect to this flow. Then we must have s j > 0, because otherwise round a(j) will end with a smaller value of x.
Next, we let f ′ be a balanced flow at the end of round t and construct an augmenting graph ∆EG based on f ′ − f as follows: the vertex set of ∆EG consists of the set of agents A and the set of goods G. For each agent i and good j, add an edge (i, j) to ∆EG if f ij < f ′ ij , and add an edge (j, i) to ∆EG if
One can assume without loss of generality that ∆EG does not contain any cycles. Note that
ij , hence there must exist at least one edge going out from good j. Pick a longest path (j = j 1 , i 1 , j 2 , i 2 , . . . , j k ) in graph ∆EG that starts from j. Note that the end of this path j k must be a good and not an agent, because for each agent i his budget with respect to p t is always at least that with respect to p a(j) . Hence j f ij ≤ j f ′ ij for every agent i, which means agent i cannot be a sink in ∆EG. Next, since f i 1 j 1 > 0, there is (j 1 , i 1 ) ∈ EG(p a(j) ). Note that also (j 1 , i 1 ) ∈ EG(p t ), since the price of good j 1 does not change from round a(j) to round t, and the prices of other goods can only increase. Because (i 1 , j 2 ) ∈ EG(p t ), we know (1) the price of good j 2 does not change from round a(j) to round t, since otherwise agent i 1 would not be interested in good j 1 at round a(j). Further, (2) O(p t ) j 1 ≥ O(p t ) j 2 , because otherwise we could assign agent i 1 to spend more money on j 1 and less money on j 2 , thereby making the flow more balanced. Using the same argument, we can prove properties (1) and (2) for i 2 , j 3 , . . . along the whole path. Thus we can conclude that the whole path is also present in EG(p t ), and that O(p t ) j 1 ≥ O(p t ) j 2 ≥ · · · ≥ O(p t ) j k . Finally, since good j k only has incoming edges, this implies s j k < O(p t ) j k ≤ 0. Then good j k must already have negative surplus at the end of round a(j) − 1, otherwise again the algorithm will end round a(j) with a smaller value of x. Hence we know a(j k ) < a(j), which contradicts the assumption that a(j) is the earliest round.
Case 2: For every good j ∈ C it holds that O(p a(j) ) j = 0. In this case, let t ′ = max j∈C a(j). Then at the end of round t ′ , for every good j ∈ C we have (p t ′ ) j = (p t ) j and O(p t ′ ) j = 0. This further implies EG ′ (p t ′ ) C ⊆ EG ′ (p t ) C . Let G t ′ 1 be the set G 1 that the algorithm selects in round t ′ . Next we pick a small enough ǫ > 0, such that EG ′ (Update(p t ′ , 1 − ǫ, G − t ′ , every good j ∈ C has non-negative surplus, and there is at least one good in C that has positive surplus, since otherwise round t ′ ends with a smaller value of x. This implies that the total demand is smaller than the total supply for all goods in C. Hence, there must exist some agent i who is connnected to some good j in C, and i also holds a positive amount of endowment of some good j ′ / ∈ C. Since EG ′ (p − t ′ ) ⊆ EG ′ (p t ), we know i ∈ C, but j ′ / ∈ C. This contradicts the fact that C is a connected component in EG ′ (p t ).
This concludes our analysis and proves the lemma. Proof. The lemma is mostly a consequence of Theorem 3 in [18] , which states that for any price vector p with Φ(p) < 1/(8m 4m 2 3Lm ) there exists a procedure that converts p into a vector of equilibrium prices. Further, the procedure consists of the following two parts:
(1) The first part of the procedure applies a sequence of adjustments to p, until the property claimed in Claim 4.3 above holds. Let p ′′ be the derived price vector at the end of this part.
(2) The second part converts p ′′ into an exact equilibrium price vector p ′ . Additionally, it has the property that p ′ i is the rational with denominator at most (m2 L ) m closest to p ′ i for every i.
In our algorithm, the property desired in the first part of their procedure directly holds according to Claim 4.3. Hence we can skip the first part of their procedure and directly round every price in p to the closest rational with denominator at most (m2 L ) m . Due to [18, Theorem 3] , the resulting price vector is guaranteed to be an exact equilibrium. where we can adjust R in Lemma 4.2 to guarantee that the final multiplicative factor is strictly less than 1 for every m ≥ 2. This implies we can employ the same proof for Theorem 3.1 to show that we get an (1 + ǫ)-approximate market equilibrium after the while loop in Alg-Linear-Rounding. Then, we can apply Lemma 4.6 to conclude that Alg-Linear-Rounding returns an exact market equilibrium. With regard to running time, log(1/ǫ) is a polynomial of m and L as ǫ = 4m/(8m 4m 2 3Lm ). Since M is a polynomial of m, L, binary search and Rounding run in polynomial time in each round of the framework. Hence, the total running time of the algorithm is polynomial in m and L.
Spending Constraint Utilities
Markets with spending constraint utilities were defined by Vazirani [37] , and they strictly generalize linear utilities. In this setting, utility of an agent i from good j is given by a set of linear segments with decreasing slope. Each linear segment l has a slope u l ij , and there is a maximum budget B l ij that can be spent on the segment. We also require u l+1 ij < u l ij for every l > 1 for concavity. Such utility functions enjoy several nice properties, such as the WGS property for tie-breaking based on ℓ 2 -norm of surplus, or uniqueness and rationality of equilibrium prices in the Fisher case [37] . There exists an extension of the DPSV algorithm [16] for computing exact equilibrium prices in Fisher markets with spending constraint utilities [37] . In [17] , the authors give an FPTAS for exchange markets with spending constraint utilities. The algorithm finds an (1 + ǫ)-approximate equilibrium in time polynomial in the input size and 1/ǫ.
We observe that both our algorithm Alg-Fisher-Precise for linear utilities in Fisher markets and Alg-Linear-Rounding for linear utilities in exchange markets are directly applicable to markets with spending constraint utilities without any modification. Furthermore, both are tâtonnement-style algorithms applicable in an unknown market environment. The reason we can apply our algorithms directly is that they work as long as (1) the market satisfies the WGS property, (2) locally the utility functions behave as linear functions, and (3) events such as the emergence of new edges in equality graph or the surpluses of two goods becoming equal all happen at rational prices. Markets with spending constraint utilities satisfy all these properties. 
